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1 Introduction
History has shown that economic development often thrives in states where governments
guarantee the rule of law and provide public goods for their citizens. In order to reach
a deeper understanding of why some countries have good government and others do not,
social scientists have become increasingly interested in studying the long-run patterns of
institutional development within states. The roots of countries’ contemporary failures or
successes have often been traced back to “critical junctures” far back in history.1
In this paper, we analyze how state development has interacted with economic develop-
ment. More specifically, we attempt to make two distinct contributions to the literature. First,
we provide a complete state history index from its first origin around 3500 BCE up until
the present day. Initially developed by Bockstette et al. (2002) for 159 countries, the index
covered the period 1–1950 CE. We extend the index from 1 CE backwards in time to the
first origins of states around 3500 BCE and also code the 1951–2000 CE period, which was
previously missing from the time series.
Second, we investigate how our extended state history index is related to indicators of
long-run economic development. The key hypothesis from our theoretical framework is that
modern levels of productivity and population density should have a hump-shaped relationship
with the extent of state history. We expect non-linear effects of state experience in the pre-
industrial era, and we predict it develops into a hump-shaped relationship by 2000 CE. In
the empirical section, we then confirm that the relationship between our state history index
and current levels of economic development has the shape of an inverted u, implying that
countries with very much or very little state experience have the least developed economies
whereas the richest countries have intermediate state history scores.
For the first of these objectives—the creation of a state history index for the BCE-period,
we follow the methodology in the original effort by Bockstette et al. (2002). This combines
three dimensions of state development: (1) The existence of a state above tribal level; (2)
Whether rule was internally or externally based (i.e. whether a country’s territory had an
autonomous government or was ruled partly or fully by an authority outside of its borders);
(3) How much of its territory was under the control of a government (as opposed to multiple
competing governments and regions still lacking state presence). The three indicators were
coded for each of the 159 countries in our sample and for each 50-year period from the origin
of the first states around 3500 BCE, yielding a panel data set with 17,490 country-period
observations. The details of the sources for and construction of the index are described further
below.
Our second objective hinged crucially on extending the state history data initially compiled
by Bockstette et al. (2002). Their study was the first to show a significant correlation between
state history and recent growth rate and between state history and income level. The numerous
studies that followed strengthened the evidence that current development is positively related
to state experience. Although subsequent versions of the index used in these papers expanded
the set of countries, none coded the history of states BCE.
With these developments in mind and with the new data on the extended state history
index, we revisit the relationship between the degree of exposure to state institutions and
current output. We show that the relationship between state history and current income per
capita across countries is hump-shaped rather than linear, and that this is due to the inclusion
of state experience before the Common Era. Thus, in addition to young, inexperienced states,
1 See for instance North (1990), Acemoglu et al. (2005), Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), and Besley and
Persson (2009).
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very old states also incur economic disadvantages relative to states with around 2000 years
of state experience.
Our inquiry is supported by the empirical observation that countries having long state
experience like Iraq, Turkey and China are poorer today than younger states like Britain,
Denmark and Japan, a fact that remained unexplained in previous work. The early experience
of the former was uncoded in the previous data, which effectively forced countries having
much more state experience to take similar values to ones having intermediate levels, such
as England (the UK).
Building on previous literature, we contribute additional knowledge about the influence
of early political and societal development on modern economic development. In a stylized
theoretical framework, we argue the earliest states developed the fiscal capacity and coordi-
nation needed to achieve increases in productivity, but ultimately limited that productivity
due to overcentralization. Although earlier states became stagnant, younger states were able
to learn from them and surpass their productivity before they reached stagnation themselves.
By contrast, very young states early in the process of building fiscal and institutional capacity,
are at a relative disadvantage. Thus, along with young states, a very long state experience also
comes with economic disadvantages relative to countries with intermediate state experience.
We show that this more complex relationship starts to be visible with respect to economic
development indicators (population density and urbanization) and technology adoption in
1500 CE, but it clearly reveals itself in 2000 CE economic performance. Moreover, the
relationship for current outcomes is further strengthened when adjusting the index for the
ancestral lines of post-1500 migrant populations.2
The work clearly involves several methodological challenges. For instance, how should a
state be defined? In this regard, we follow the tradition of Service (1962), Carneiro (1981),
Johnson and Earle (2000) and others, distinguishing between bands, chiefdoms, and full-
fledged states. Unlike the other forms of governments, states are further characterized by a
centralized government with the ability to collect taxes, enforce laws, and mobilize forces
for war. Using this definition, the literature seems to be in rough agreement about the time
when states arise in different countries. Accompanying this paper is an extensive online data
appendix where we motivate the coding for each country-period observation.
Another issue concerns the unit of analysis, which is the territory delimited by the modern-
day country borders of 159 contemporary countries in the sample. It is a well-known fact that
the borders of current countries sometimes have very little resemblance with the geopolitical
logic in ancient times. As discussed in Sect. 5.4, several factors have played decisive roles
in the reconfiguration of borders through history, including military conquest and coloniza-
tion by foreign powers. We discuss the potential risks associated with shifting borders, in
terms of retroactive measurement error for historical outcomes and bias in the estimates for
contemporaneous outcomes.
A potential alternative to using country borders could have been to divide the world
into equal-sized grid cells (or “virtual countries”) and then study the history of each such
cell. This would however entail a separate set of coding challenges that we leave for future
work. The problem of endogenous borders is arguably somewhat mitigated in regressions
with contemporaneous outcome variables since most countries actually have changed their
borders throughout history. We would further argue that to the extent that researchers are
interested in tracking the histories of countries in order to understand contemporary levels
of development, the modern configuration of countries is still a natural point of departure.
2 Olsson and Paik (2013) hint at this relationship, showing a “reversal of fortune” of countries that made an
early Neolithic transition. The idea of economic reversal was also discussed by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and
Hariri (2012).
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The paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, we provide an overview of the literature
on the definition of a state and the relationship of state history to economic development. In
Sect. 3, we present our theoretical framework. In Sect. 4 we present the new data and the
principles guiding its construction. In Sect. 5, we carry out an econometric analysis of the
relationship between economic development and state history. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
2.1 State history and economic development
It is a well established empirical fact that history has shaped the contemporary economic
development of nations in numerous ways. Whether initial biogeographic endowment and
transition to agriculture (e.g. Hibbs and Olsson 2004; Olsson and Hibbs 2005; Galor and
Moav 2007) or past technology adoption (Comin et al. 2010), early and productive starts
have been typically shown to translate into better income and institutions in present times.
The experience with state institutions has been put forth as one of the important correlates
of the current wealth distribution in the world. Specifically, from its original development,
the State antiquity index of Bockstette et al. (2002) was shown to be positively associated
with 1995 income and with the 1960–1995 GDP growth rate. Bockstette et al.’s aim was
to use presence and duration of experience with macro polities as one of several potential
indicators of societal complexity and level of technological advancement. The authors were
interested in investigating the effect of early social and technological development on post-
WW2 economic growth rates, and they assumed that the impact of very early experience
would decay over time, so they did not attempt to code information on state presence before
1 CE or after 1950. They coded all countries with substantial populations for which relevant
economic growth and other indicators were available, resulting in a sample of 104 countries,
of which their analysis focused especially on 70 non-OECD member countries.
Roughly the same data set was also used by Chanda and Putterman (2005), and Chanda
and Putterman (2007). Bockstette et al.’s data were subsequently expanded to include more
ex-Communist countries (Iliev and Putterman 2007), more African countries (Cinyabuguma
and Putterman 2011), and a few other countries for which complementary income or other
required data had initially been viewed as unreliable. Based on this extended dataset, Putter-
man and Weil (2010) demonstrated that the ability of state history to predict current levels
of development is greatly strengthened by replacing the state history that transpired on a
given country’s territory by the weighted average state history of the places in which current
residents’ ancestors lived in the past. This adjustment was motivated by the large movements
of populations especially from “Old World” continents to the Americas, Australia and New
Zealand after 1500. Chanda et al. (2014) apply the same procedure to demonstrate “persis-
tence of fortune” of ancestral lines in former colonies that display a “reversal of fortune”
(Acemoglu et al. 2002) in the absence of such ancestry and migration accounting.3
In short, previous work has largely agreed on a positive association between long-run
state history and current development. However, as scholars have acknowledged, the present
shares complex links with the past. For instance, pre-1500 economic advantages seem to
have become relative disadvantages among colonized countries during the colonial era (Ace-
3 The state history data have also been employed in a number of other studies, receiving focal attention in
Ang (2013a, b), playing important roles in Ahlerup and Olsson (2012), Hariri (2012), Ertan et al. (2016),
and Daniele (2013), and being included as a control in a number of other studies. None of the above studies
attempts to extend the information on states to include the BCE years or fill in the last half of the 20th Century.
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moglu et al. 2001, 2002). As of late, this idea of reversal has been revisited in two studies
that are particularly relevant to our paper: Hariri (2012) presents compelling evidence that
early (precolonial) experience of state institutions in countries outside Europe prevented them
from transplanting democratic institutions brought by European colonizers, leaving instead
an “autocratic legacy” in these countries. Olsson and Paik (2013) reveal a negative associ-
ation between the time from Neolithic transition and current income levels in the Western
agricultural core—Europe, North Africa and Southwestern Asia.
Furthermore, the long-run persistence literature has begun to reveal nonlinearities in how
events in the very distant past affect economic development. For instance, the migration
out of Africa is argued to have generated a wide array of genetic diversity levels in human
populations around the world. In turn, predicted genetic diversity displays a hump-shaped
relationship with indicators of economic development, including per capita income in 2000
(Ashraf and Galor 2013).
Thus, in light of these recent developments, allowing for a more flexible relationship
between state history and contemporaneous levels of development is a natural extension to
the literature. The closest paper to ours to have done so is Lagerlöf (2016), which presented
simulations of a theoretical model consistent with a hump-shaped relationship where old
states with a large extractive capacity and autocratic elites have been overtaken by younger
and more democratic states with a greater growth potential. The empirical evidence hints
at a concave relationship between contemporary income levels and state history in a cross-
country sample, based on the 1–1950 CE state history index, but only when adjusted for
post-1500 migration.
In the theoretical section, we present a framework outlining how states affect and are
affected by economic development over history and in the empirical section we explore
systematically this relationship considering the complete state histories.
2.2 Defining the “state”
How do we know when a state has emerged? The first challenge stems from the question of
how to define the state, hardly a novel dilemma in social sciences. The classical understanding
of the “state ” comes from Max Weber, who defined it as an entity which “upholds the claim to
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber
1968, p. 54). This implies that we should be looking for evidence of the initial monopolization
of power within a certain territory.
However, there is also the question of the extent of this original jurisdiction: how large is the
population or the territory subject to the power monopoly? Is, for instance, a village with 100
tribesmen, led by a chief, large enough to classify as “state”? It appears that we need to find
an appropriate threshold to distinguish between small and large scale political organization.
Therefore we adopt the convention that, although simple chiefdoms fall short of being states,
a paramount chiefdom which incorporates multiple individually substantial chiefdoms can be
understood as a form of incipient state. Hence we decided to begin according partial weight
when a polity reaches this level. By this convention, for instance, the land of what is today
Belgium came under large-scale political organization for the first time between 59 and 52
BCE, when it was integrated in the Roman Empire.
This agrees with established sociological and anthropological taxonomies of human soci-
eties throughout their evolution. For instance, Johnson and Earle (2000) proposed a division
of societies into small-scale local group (further divided into family, village and the Big Man
group) and larger-scale regional polity, which can be a chiefdom or a state. This distinction
goes back even earlier, to Charles Tilly: “the term [state] includes city-states, empires, theoc-
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racies, and many other forms of government, but excludes tribes,” (Tilly 1990, p. 1) and to
Service’s (1962) proposed typology of bands/tribes/chiefdoms/states.4
3 Theoretical framework
In this section, we outline the theoretical framework underlying the empirical analysis. We
present the three basic premises of the model and then use four country case studies to
illustrate the kind of dynamics that we have in mind which eventually produce a hump-shaped
hypothesized relationship between state history and indicators of aggregate productivity. In
the third subsection, we explain briefly how our intuitive framework fits into a more standard
Malthusian growth model.
3.1 The basic premises
The key assumption of our framework is that up to a point, accumulated state history favors
capacity building, taxation and the provision of public goods, which in turn spur economic
growth. But beyond a certain level, state experience is conducive to the rise of extractive
institutions and powerful elites that appropriate tax revenue rather than turn it into public
goods. In the absence of constraining institutions, excessive centralization ultimately leads
the state into stagnation. When more experienced states have reached this level, they tend to
be overtaken by less experienced states still in their expansion phase (as bottom-up pressures
in the latter bring about executive constraints). Of course, the state as such is not the only
driver of growth, for example processes of technological improvement and trade expansion
promoted in neighboring states may spill over to nearby areas. We nonetheless emphasize
state experience as it is our focal empirical measure and it represents a key dimension of the
development process over the very long run. We note again that by ”state experience” we
refer not only to duration of presence of macro polities, but also degree of unity, territorial
coverage, and locally rather than externally based rule.
The proposed relationship between state history and long-run economic development has
three distinct premises: (1) In a newly established state, an increase in fiscal and institutional
capacity and in central coordination from low levels have historically been conducive to
productivity increases and economic growth. (2) Governments in long enduring states often
tend to misuse the tax revenue at the expense of economic progress, despite having access to
a solid fiscal capacity. (3) Citizens of countries having less powerfully consolidated states can
exploit the experience and mistakes of countries with greater degrees of internally-imposed
power centralization, to advance their levels of productivity beyond the maximum reached
by the latter. We discuss the evidence supporting these premises below.
First, there is widespread agreement that a very short state history, especially if character-
ized by a lack of autonomy and rule instability generally implies weaker fiscal capacity. This
has recently been discussed among others by Tilly (1990), Collier (2009), and Besley and
Persson (2013). Increasing evidence shows that a consolidated bureaucracy enables invest-
ments in large public projects, technological innovation, and effective warfare, thus spurring
economic growth. Recent empirical studies on the historical role of state capacity reveal
strong correlations and potential causal links between administrative infrastructure, high
taxes and economic prosperity (Besley and Persson 2013; Dincecco and Katz 2014).
4 We thank Jacob Gerner Hariri for useful references on the matter of state definition.
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Second, older and more autonomous states are more predisposed to maintain overly cen-
tralized, often abusive power structures. The first states developed naturally from the basic
need to sustain collective action in large communities, particularly in response to attacks
by predators (Tilly 1990 and Olson 1993 and more recently, Mayshar et al. 2015). Against
“roving bandits,” it was welfare enhancing to have a member of the community become the
dictator who collected rents used partly for defense, but mostly for self-gratification (“sta-
tionary bandit”). However, without mechanisms to commit to providing a certain level of
public good, the autocrat became a “roving bandit,” maximizing rent-extraction. Hence, as
Olson concludes, in an autocracy good economic performance is unsustainable in the long
run.
Examples of political and economic collapse in ancient states due to overcentralization
abound. For instance, the demise of the expansive Mesopotamian empire Ur III (c. 2000 BCE)
came when local city-states sought independence, rejecting the overbearing supercentralized
bureaucracy tailored to channel resources from the periphery to Ur and finance the defense
of conquered regions (Yoffee 1988). Similarly, only a few centuries later Hammurabi’s great
empire collapsed after disempowered local authorities rebelled against the drain on resources
for the king’s glorification in Babylon, plunging the state into an irreversible economic crisis
(c. 1600 BCE).
Complementary evidence comes from Hariri (2012) who shows that older indigenously
formed states were more likely to develop autocratic institutions than later states. His pro-
posed channel is that older states more successfully fended off attempts at colonization by
European powers between the 15th and 20th centuries, and hence did not experience either
direct transplantation of or cultural influence related to conceptions of democratic institutions
(developed between the 18th and 20th centuries within the Western colonizing powers).
Non-inclusive institutions and political instability also undermine fiscal capacity (see e.g.
Besley and Persson 2013 and Dincecco and Katz 2014).5 Early states incurred frequent
regime changes due to predatory attacks and internal strife.6 Moreover, ancient warfare did
not stimulate tax collection to the same extent modern warfare does (Gennaioli and Voth
2015). Lacking sustainable revenue generation and constraints against turning resources
away from public goods and technological innovation made earlier states more vulnerable to
economic stagnation and collapse.
Third, we argue that countries with less state experience tend to be able to reach a higher
level of development than countries with more (and usually longer) state experience before
their stagnation phase sets in. This is supported by the pattern of superior economic develop-
ment in countries with an intermediate length of a civilization, like the United Kingdom and
the Scandinavian countries, compared to countries like Egypt or Iraq, as discussed in recent
work by Olsson and Paik (2013).7 Again, the main arguments here are institutional: Olsson
and Paik argue that old civilizations developed autocratic, hierarchical societies that were not
conducive to the emergence of democracy and innovation, which became critical factors for
economic growth during the modern era, leading to a “Western reversal of fortune” since the
5 Using data from 11 European countries for 1600–1913, Dincecco and Katz (2014) present causal evidence
that historical reforms of tax centralization and, to some extent, constraints on the executive, led to higher tax
revenue and improved infrastructure provision, which then stimulated economic growth. By contrast, states
with more autonomous regional authorities generated smaller revenues.
6 Our statehist index captures political fragmentation (simultaneous existence of multiple states within a
territory) through a downgrade in the territorial component, and reflects capture by external empires through
a downgrade in the internal rule component.
7 Olsson and Paik (2013) also present preliminary evidence for overtaking of older by younger states in East
Asia and in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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onset of agriculture.8 Similarly, Lagerlöf (2016) argues the autocratic elite in old states made
repeated investments in extractive capacity, while the lack of a similar extractive capacity in
younger states facilitates the transition to a faster-growing democracy. Democratic political
structures with constraints on executive power may have developed in initially peripheral
areas like England, the Netherlands and Scandinavia, because local and commercial elites
effectively countered tendencies towards power centralization during the maturation process
of these younger nation-states. Executive constraints, in turn, set the premise for unhindered
technological innovation and may have mitigated the economic downturns accompanying
domestic struggles for political leadership (Cox and Weingast 2015).
The regions once peripheral to the more ancient civilizations, slower to develop state
institutions, were also less exposed to raids by roaming armies and to incursions by migrating
peoples (such as the Persian, Hellenic, Hun, Islamic, Mongol and Turkic incursions in the
old civilizational core regions). All these factors contributed to their ability to eventually
overtake the levels of development in the older states.9
3.2 The predicted pattern
The three central factors discussed above combine to form the basis of a stylized pattern
of state history and economic development. Figure 1a showcases this pattern, using four
current countries, all located in the Western agricultural spread zone,10 as case studies. We
assume, for simplicity, a logistic, positive relationship between state history and aggregate
productivity in the spirit of existing long-run models.11 We do not, however, argue that every
country necessarily follows this proximate pattern. Needless to say, the short account below
does not have any ambition of providing a full description of the histories of Egypt, Italy,
United Kingdom and Estonia. Please see the extensive Data Appendix for details about state
development and our coding of historical events. Although we only use four examples, we
do argue that the model below is applicable in broad outline also to the rest of the world.12
To the far left in the figure, we use Egypt as an example of a very old civilization where
the first signs of a state-like organization above tribal level emerged around 3200 BCE. From
a low pre-state level of development, total productivity in the economy started to increase
when the government of a full state was able to extract taxes from the population that, in
turn, were transformed into public goods that provided security and a more efficient mode
of agricultural production. A few centuries after the origins of the state, development took
8 Wittfogel’s (1957) “hydraulic hypothesis” makes the related argument that the old riverine civilizations
were autocratic due to the technological nature of large-scale irrigation. See also Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012) for an analysis of how countries with inclusive, democratic institutions eventually tend to dominate
countries with extractive, autocratic institutions.
9 Olsson and Paik (2016) further argue that an early transition to agriculture led to the outbreak of several
new infectious diseases which probably killed numerous inhabitants in the growing farming villages. The
prevalence of infectious disease most likely also contributed to a collectivist culture with a strong in-group
orientation and a suspicious attitude towards strangers and new ideas. But the impact of disease may have
been different in late medieval/early modern Europe; see Voigtlander and Voth (2013).
10 That is, countries whose first adoption of agriculture was based on the Fertile Crescent package of crops
and domesticated animals, as opposed to that of China, Mesoamerica, etc. See Hibbs and Olsson (2004) and
Diamond (1997).
11 The logistic curve, with its implied take-off and maturity stages, is similar in spirit to the account in
Rostow (1960). However, unlike Rostow, our model deals primarily with long history including pre-industrial
development.
12 In a previous version of the paper, we modelled explicitly how fiscal capacity and central coordination of
economic activities interacted with total factor productivity in a full Malthusian growth model.
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off in the classic period of the Old Kingdom with large cities, massive public monuments,
codified language and a highly stratified, complex society.
However, as outlined in detail in our Data Appendix, the centralized government of Egypt
began to run into problems by 2130 BCE during the 8th dynasty, when a decades-long drought
and famine set off the fragmentation of central power. Repeated foreign invasions from the
Hyksos in 1650 BCE and onwards implied that Egypt gradually lost its economic and military
dominance over the region, until a succession of foreign invaders such as the Assyrians, Per-
sians, Macedonians, and Romans caused a marked slowdown in productivity growth. During
the first millennium BCE, Egypt arguably started its long period of stagnation, characterized
by slower productivity growth than the civilizations on the northern rim of the Mediterranean,
which has by and large persisted to the present. By 1 CE, the Romans had conquered all lands
around the Mediterranean and had surpassed the Egyptians technologically, militarily, and
also in terms of state organization.
State origins in Italy can be traced back to the Etruscans in 850 BCE, more than two thou-
sand years after similar developments in Egypt. As is well known, the Roman republic with
its innovative political institutions and military organization, would soon become the great-
est empire in Western Eurasia and forcefully dominate the lands around the Mediterranean.
Economic stagnation set in with the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire circa 476 CE.
While historians still argue about the main causes, it appears that political fragmentation and
power struggles between the Church, senatorial aristocracy and the military led to territorial
concessions to the barbarian invaders, a weakening of fiscal capacity and ultimately eco-
nomic bankruptcy.13 However, as seen in our stylized figure, Italy long continued to be the
most developed country among our four countries even after the fall of Rome. The barbarian
tribes that invaded Rome soon tried to mimic Roman traditions and Latin lived on as a lingua
franca for centuries due to the rising power of the Pope in the Vatican. Merchant sea powers
such as Venice and Genoa would become very powerful in the early Medieval period and the
Renaissance period was still a very innovative period in the history of the Italian peninsula,
with progress in many fields.
However, with the emergence of Protestantism in northern Europe, the discovery of new
trading routes on the Atlantic, and the increasing power of emerging centralized states in
France and Britain, Italy started its period of economic and technological stagnation.14 Com-
pared to Italy, the emergence of a centralized state in Britain came quite late, beginning with
external governance by Rome around 50 BCE and internal polities from AD 401. Spurred
by revenues from Atlantic trade and from institutional innovations that strengthened private
property rights and accountable political institutions, Britain rose to eventually become the
leading power in the world after the Napoleonic wars ended in 1815. The cluster of inno-
vations that formed the backbone of the Industrial Revolution contributed to a dramatic rise
in output per capita and to the breakdown of the Malthusian link between income levels
and fertility. After World War I, the United Kingdom arguably entered a phase of relative
stagnation in which it clearly lagged behind, for instance, the United States.
The territory of current Estonia was populated by tribes with no organized government
until 1237, when the area was taken by Denmark and by German knights. Sweden and
Russia then controlled the region until 1919 when Estonia experienced a brief period of
independence, before it was once again swallowed by the Soviet Union after World War
13 See Yoffee (1988) for a brief discussion of the political decline and economic transformation of the Western
Roman Empire.
14 See Puga and Trefler (2014) for an account of how a change in political institutions that increased the power
of a small elite, led to the gradual decline of Venice after 1297.
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Fig. 1 Predicted pattern of accumulated state history and productivity. a Stylized model and illustrations of
long-run state history and economic development. b Relationship between log GDP per capita in 2000 and state
history in four illustrative countries. c Relationship between Technology Adoption and Statehist in 1 CE, 1500
CE and 2000 CE in full cross section of countries. Note: a Shows a stylized model of the long-run relationship
between state history and aggregate productivity, using Estonia, England, Italy and Egypt as examples. In the
left-hand side of the figure, we explain the typical development over time in the logistic development curves
with the four basic states of origins, take-off, slowdown, and eventually stagnation. In the right-hand side of the
figure, we map the development of the four states over time into a specific combination of state history scores
Si and its corresponding productivity from the left-hand side. b Shows the actual combinations of log GDP
per capita in 2000 and the main state history score, using a depreciation rate of 1%, for these four illustrative
countries. c Shows the predicted Technology Adoption index from Comin et al. (2010) fitted as a polynomial
of extended Statehist, for 1 CE, 1500 CE and 2000 CE for our full cross-section of countries. The shaded areas
are the confidence intervals of the mean. Sources: Data presented below
II. The country did not become fully independent until 1991. The country therefore has a
relatively low state history score. Nonetheless, the country has pushed for innovation, such
as e-government, and economic growth has been fast since independence with income per
capita standing at about 70% of that of United Kingdom in 2014.
Focusing on the states’ age part of state experience, the highly stylized logistic devel-
opment curves in Fig. 1a only differ along two dimensions: the timing of state emergence
123
J Econ Growth
and the maximum level of attainable development, which increases with every new state.
Our argument above proposes that highly centralized governments, typically in the earliest
states, in the long run supported less economic dynamism than states where powers were
devolved to different institutions. In addition, relative newcomers caught up with and even-
tually overtook older states. The Romans could learn from experience of Egypt that a state
led by a divine regent was inferior to a republican and subsequently imperial order that made
better use of human resources, politically and militarily. After 1500 CE, England could over-
take Italy in part due to its access to trade and colonization opportunities associated with its
Atlantic-facing location, but also due to far superior political institutions that strengthened the
accountability of government, encouraged commerce, saw the emergence of superior naval
and military capabilities, and led to a leading position in the emerging system of international
credit.15 Our long-run representation implies that Estonia may eventually overtake United
Kingdom in productivity when it converges to its long-run maximum level where stagnation
ensues. However, like many other countries, Estonia has not yet reached this stage.
To sum up, in Fig. 1a we see that the long-term trend is that the relationship between state
experience and productivity is predicted to turn negative among more mature states. This
negative relationship arises since newer states reach a higher maximum level of productivity
than their older neighboring states. However, due to the fact that many countries are still
in a transition period to their long-run steady state level of productivity, there will be a
positive-sloping part of the overall contemporary curve as well (the segment between Estonia
and England in the figure). Taken together, these opposing trends imply a hump-shaped
relationship between state history and contemporary measures of productivity.
In Fig. 1b, we illustrate the consistency with this hypothesis of the pattern of data on
accumulated state history and level of GDP per capita in 2000 CE for the four countries
discussed above. In line with the prediction, we find that the fitted non-linear curve is indeed
hump-shaped with an upward-sloping part between Estonia and United Kingdom and a
negative-sloping part to the right. In the empirical section below, we investigate more formally
this non-linear relationship in a large cross-section of countries.
It should further be noted that our model actually implies that the relationship between
state history and aggregate productivity should change over time. In the year 500 BCE,
for example, Fig. 1a suggests that Egypt was ahead of Italy, which, in turn, was ahead of
England and Estonia in terms of productivity, so that the relationship between state history
and productivity at the time should be strictly positive.
As an initial test of our model, we show in Fig. 1c the evolution over time of the rela-
tionship between state history and our preferred proxy for productivity (a composite index
of technology adoption from Comin et al. 2010) for a cross-section of all countries in the
world with available data. When the relationship is estimated early in history, in year 1 CE,
we find indeed that the fitted non-linear curve has a positive slope, implying that older states
(like Egypt) were more technologically advanced at the time. The curve then tilts to become
distinctly concave with a short negative-sloping section in 1500 CE, with a clear hump-shape
emerging in 2000 CE. In Figure C1 in the Appendix, we show that a similar pattern is evident
in 1 CE and 1500 CE when we use population density as our proxy for productivity. Our
interpretation of this evidence is that it is consistent with the model outlined in Fig. 1a where
the disadvantages of being an early state eventually manifest and lead to a gradually stronger
negative relationship for older states.16
15 See Kennedy (1989) for a seminal work on the rise and fall of great Western powers after 1500 CE.
16 As Estonia and countries with still younger states, such as New Guinea, develop to their full potential, our
model predicts a long-run negative relationship—eventually younger states will be more productive than older
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Although Fig. 1a considers the age of states only, other dimensions of state history, such
as experience with home-based rule, can also help to account for some countries’ laggardness
or advance. In some cases, in North Africa and the Middle East, colonization by middle-aged
states (e.g British, French) may have generated negative effects on the level of stagnation
of earlier developed states. Extractive institutions and other forms of economic domination
fuelled by globalization may not only have helped the later comers to overtake earlier states,
but may even have influenced the productivity stagnation or decline of the latter.17
At the other end of the statehist spectrum, young colonial states, especially those in Sub-
Saharan Africa with no pre-colonial state institutions, have not only had short histories, but
also have spent more than half of their macro-political histories under external rule. With
modern state structures thrust upon them from without, they could not build institutional
capacity organically. This left them vulnerable in the face of post-colonial challenges, against
the backdrop of ethnic divisions, over-reliance on natural resources, and a legacy of extractive
institutions (Collier 2009). The post-colonial experience highlights that extractive institutions
are not exclusively a feature of longer state histories. As a possible consequence, post-
independence productivity levels in many countries with young states have declined and
income per capita is lower today than in 1960. Thus, while Fig. 1c above suggests that the
hump-shaped relationship between state history and aggregate productivity is only transient,
other forces at play shed uncertainty over whether and when a globally negative relationship
between the two variables will eventually emerge.
Note that if state history before year 1 CE is not counted, as was the case in the statehist
index used by Bockstette et al. (2002) and subsequent papers until the present, the state
history score for Egypt would be closer to that of Italy. This party explains why analyses
based on the data heretofore available tended to find a positive relationship between state
history and level of development around the end of the 20th Century (note again the exception
of Lagerlöf 2016, discussed above).
3.3 Towards a growth model
The stylized pattern above can be translated into a growth theory framework generating
specific hypotheses to be tested in the empirical section.
Let Sit be the accumulated state history of a country i at time t , where a greater Sit
implies that the country has had a more substantial experience of unified, home based, large-
scale states. For simplicity, we assume that Sit is a positive, linear function of time from
the date of state origins onwards. The first state is i = 1. Thus, the index i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}
Footnote 16 continued
over the full range of cases. Such a reversal in relative developmental ranking is strongly related to the findings
for the Western world in Olsson and Paik (2013). Of course, the framework ignores the possibility that old
states might achieve new vigor by borrowing approaches from younger ones, something that could become
more common in a world of declining cultural and informational barriers. We accordingly view assumptions
underlying Fig. 1a as useful for organizing historical experience to date, but perhaps not for formulating
predictions about the distant future.
17 However, the overall situation in this regard is quite complex and without further analysis we cannot
formulate a general conclusion as to whether colonization and economic domination by states of medium
age were or were not on balance net contributors to the stagnation of earlier states. For many earlier states
colonization was typically either late or never came: Hariri (2012) and Ertan et al. (2016) show that older
states (such as China and Turkey) were most likely not to have been colonized by Europeans at all, and Ertan
et al. show that if they were colonized (as with what are now the countries of the Levant) it tended to be much
later than other countries. Hariri argues that being colonized was advantageous in the sense that it promoted
modernization (democratization) of institutions, relative to countries not colonized.
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reflects the historical order of state formation.18 We define total factor productivity Ait as a
function Ai (Sit ) with ∂ Ai (Sit )/∂Sit > 0, where the positive relationship with state history
takes the form of a non-linear, logistic curve as in Fig. 1a. At low levels of Sit , aggregate
productivity increases sharply with Sit but as state history accumulates, stagnation sets in
and ∂ Ai (Sit , i)/∂Sit approaches zero.
We also assume that for any given level of state history S > 0, Ai (S) < Ai+1(S), i.e. of
two countries with identical accumulated levels of state history, the state which emerged at
later t will be able to attain a higher level of productivity at every level of S and eventually
reach a higher maximum productivity.19 This advantage stems mainly from the fact that new
states could learn from the experiences of older states, or that countries in which the state
developed later have been more successful at avoiding the overcentralization of power.
In the preindustrial era, in terms of a standard Malthusian growth model, total output in
a territory is given by Yit = Ait Xαi L1−αi t where Yit is the total output, Xi the fixed amount
of land in the country, and Lit the level of population (Ashraf and Galor 2011). In a long-
run, Malthusian equilibrium, output per capita Yit/Lit = yit is constant since any temporary
increases in Yit are offset by higher birth rates, hence population, so that yit eventually returns
to its steady-state level y¯i .
Combining the elements above, we can express the Malthusian equilibrium as
y¯i = Ai (Sit ) ·
(
Xi
Lit
)α
= Ai (Sit ) · p−αi t (1)
where pit = Lit/Xi is the population density of country i at time t . Over the long run, as
productivity Ait grows in response to the increase in state experience Sit , population density
pit will also increase and country i’s Malthusian equilibrium level of income per capita y¯i
will remain intact. When two countries at a given point in time have reached the stagnation
level, where Ait is unresponsive to further increases in Sit , the level of productivity Ait (as
well as the level of population density pit ) will be relatively lower in the country where
states emerged early (with a higher Sit and a lower i) compared to the country where states
emerged later.
There are thus two countervailing effects of extensive state experience on Ait : On the one
hand, greater state experience increases the level of productivity within a country directly, up
to the steady-state (through fiscal capacity and centralized coordination). But since a higher
level of state history also typically implies an early state, its level of productivity is limited
compared to countries with later states. This pattern eventually gives rise to the hump-shaped
cross-sectional relationship between Ait and Sit some time during the Malthusian era. Note
that our model also implies a hump-shaped relationship between Sit and pit . We expect these
patterns to emerge by the end of the Malthusian era and therefore, in the empirical section, we
test these hypotheses using an index of technology as a proxy for Ait and levels of population
density and urbanization rates as our measures of pit in 1500 CE.
In the industrial era, the Malthusian link between productivity levels Ait and levels of
population density pit typically disappears after a period of adjustment. Income levels per
capita Yit/Lit = yit then tend to be strongly positively correlated with higher levels of
Ait (Hall and Jones 1999). For the contemporary era, we will therefore proxy aggregate
18 Note that we can assume Sit < S jt for i < j only by adopting the implicit assumption that variation in
the territorial coverage, unity, and home based dimensions of our full state history index leave ordering by
time of establishment as an adequate approximation. In this subsection, we use state age as shorthand for state
experience in its more complete sense for convenience of exposition.
19 Note that this assumption also implies that the logistic curves will attain a more and more steep curvature
to the right in Fig. 1a.
123
J Econ Growth
productivity by income per capita, which is of course also the standard measure of economic
prosperity, and study whether the the historical impact of Sit on Ait prevails even after the
transition to modern economies.
4 Data
In this section, we outline how the existing index of state history has been extended to cover
the BCE period. We will also briefly present some of the key tendencies in the new data
series.
4.1 Constructing the index
The construction of the index for the BCE period follows the principles developed by Bock-
stette et al. (2002), applied here to 159 modern-day countries.20 We use evidence of written
records where available. Where not extant, we rely on archaeological data, following a “diag-
nostic traits” approach: we consider material manifestations of the monopolization of power,
as an “archaeological confirmation of the process of state formation” (Jones and Kautz 1981,
pp. 16–17). These can be monumental structures, such as palaces, temples or large urban set-
tlements etc. In the case of Iraq, for instance, there is the transition from small to large urban
centers with grand architectural structures such as Uruk in the middle of the 4th millennium
BCE.21
The second task is to mark the transition from chiefdom to fully-fledged state. Following
the paradigm of the evolution of pristine states from chiefdoms (see e.g. Carneiro 1981; Earle
1987; Flannery 1995; Marcus 1992; Spencer 1990; Spencer and Redmond 2004), we mark
this distinction in our data by assigning the following values: Band/tribe is marked by a rule
score of 0, paramount chiefdom is assigned 0.75 and fully-fledged state receives the value 1.
Robert Carneiro emphasizes that the paramount chiefdom is the evolutionary link between
autonomous bands or tribes and the state.22
While it is difficult to know exactly where the chiefdom ends and where the state begins
in pre-history, we have made efforts to draw a sensible line where the evidence suggests a
noteworthy evolution in socio-political organization.23 While this approach is not uncontro-
versial, it is the most feasible given limited documentary resources. We further detail the
assignment of scores in a later section.
For each country, the time of emergence of the first state institutions on its territory is
identified, as defined above. State age is defined as the time elapsed from this date until 2000
20 The reader is referred to online Appendix B for a more detailed discussion of the coding procedures and
exceptions.
21 Admittedly, the drawback of this “symptomatic” approach is that it blurs the boundary between state and
civilization and it is susceptible to misclassifying an emerging or transient civilization into a state in the sense
adopted above (see Sect. 2.2).
22 In his definition, the paramount chiefdom is “an autonomous political unit comprising a number of villages
or communities under the permanent control of a paramount chief” (Carneiro 1981, p. 45), while the state is
“an autonomous political unit, encompassing many communities within its territory and having a centralized
government with the power to collect taxes, draft men for work or war, and decree and enforce laws” (Carneiro
1970, p. 733).
23 Such is the case of Mexico, where we assign a score of 0.75 to the period 450–100 BCE for the early urban
settlements at Chiapas and Oaxaca. We then raise this score to 1 in 100 BCE when large-scale urban growth
at Teotihuacan and the development of previously missing institutions such as a standing army warrant the
status of fully-fledged state.
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CE. The oldest state was established on the land of today’s Iraq around 3500 BCE. Hence,
the time for all countries is divided into 110 periods of 50-years.
For each country i and half century t , scores are assigned to reflect three dimensions of
state presence, based on the following questions24:
1. Is there a government above the tribal level? Score component z1i t receives 1 point if yes,
0.75 if the government can at best be described as a paramount chiefdom and 0 points if
no government is present.
2. Is this government foreign or locally based? z2i t is 1 if the rule is locally based, 0.5 if
externally based, and 0.75 for local government with substantial foreign oversight.25
3. How much of the territory of the modern country was ruled by this government? z3i t
reflects the proportions of the territory under some rule: 1 (over 50%), 0.75 (25–50%),
0.5 (10–25%), 0.3 (under 10%).26
Time is indexed by t and refers to a 50-year period ranging from t = 0 for 3500–3451 BCE
when the first state arose, to t = 109 for 1951–2000 CE). For every such time interval, we
compute a composite State index score by multiplying the three components by one another
and by 5027:
sit = z1i t · z2i t · z3i t · 50 (2)
Finally, joining the BCE-with the preexisting CE-era series, we aggregate all “flow” scores
sit into Statehist—the comprehensive index of the cumulative state history.28 The index is
normalized by the score of a hypothetical state with full discounted scores between 3500
BCE and the period of interest τ :
Siτ =
∑τ
t=0(1 + ρ)t−τ · sit∑τ
t=0(1 + ρ)t−τ · 50
(3)
This cumulative Statehist index Siτ ranges from 0 to 1 and can be calculated at virtually
any point in history τ = {0, 1, . . . 109}. We calculate it mainly for 1500 CE (at τ = 99) and
for 2000 CE, usually discounting the more distant past relative to the present by setting ρ > 0,
although usually at a modest value. For instance, the Statehist value of a state with full scores
discounted at 1% between 3500 BCE and 2000 CE is 3359.79. The previous literature has
employed ρ = 0.05, in light of the reasonable assumption that the more distant past matters
less today than recent history. With the additional data, however, this rate gives almost no
24 Each dimension is denoted by zci t , which is the score for component c in country i for period t.
25 If there were multiple polities within a present country’s borders, its state score for the period is coded as
a simple average of their respective scores.
26 For multiple contemporaneous states within what is now a single country z3i t is adjusted down one category,
because centralized coordination is assumed to decrease.
27 Half century periods are used in order to simplify value assignments for the large number of case-period units
in which there is either no known state or available information imprecisely dated. This periodization affects
the index’s construction when there is detailed information only insofar as the time discounting procedure
discussed below is applied to half centuries. Within period changes in zci t require averaging the scores over
subperiods, using as weights the number of years in each sub-period θ divided by 50:
sit = 50 ·
[
(z1i t1 · z2i t1 · z3i t1) · wi t1 + (z1i t2 · z2i t2 · z3i t2) · wi t2 + · · ·
]
.
28 Some minor adjustments were made to the years 1–1950 CE data of a few countries, but the correlation
with the initial index, considering year 1 to 1950 CE periods only, is 99%.
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weight to the long stream of sit -scores before 1 CE.29 While it of course remains to be seen
below just how useful placing weight on the distant past will be, our convention is to employ
the 1% discount factor when calculating the normalized Statehist score.30
To answer the three questions (a-c) above in a manner that is consistent across periods,
we relied mainly on information in the Encyclopedia Britannica Online, but also additional
sources where information in Britannica was insufficient. We provide additional detail on
our data sources and illustrate the coding process and further data aggregations in online
Appendix B. Accompanying this paper is also an online Data Coding Appendix, which
provides a comprehensive list of coding decisions for all country-period observations.
4.2 A brief look at the data
In this section we present some patterns that arise from the complete state history time series
and the data used in forthcoming analyses.
Firstly, we note that the evolution of state institutions in the world follows approximately
an exponential upward trend with periods of rapid growth punctuated by periods of stagnation
(Fig. 2). The graph shows the log of the aggregated percentage score for all contemporary
countries in our sample on the vertical axis plotted against number of years BCE or CE
on the horizontal axis. The percentage score in period t is calculated as State index world
(t) = 100 ·∑Ni=1sit/ (N · 50) where N = 159 is the number of included countries and where
sit ∈ [0, 50] is the state history score for country i during 50-year interval t , as described
above.31 A value close to 0% in this world index indicates that there is almost no sign of state
presence in any of the included countries in period t whereas a score of 100 means that all
159 countries reach the maximum value sit = 50 in our state measure during that period.32
Several periods are characterized by rapid state evolution whereas other periods are marked
by a general decline. The first boom in state emergence appears already in 3500–2300 BCE,
which then ends with a long period of stagnation. The other major stagnations in the figure
happened around 1750 BCE, 1200 BCE, and 400 CE. A second period of rapid growth was
850 BCE–1 CE during the Iron Age. From just after the collapse of the Roman empire around
450 CE, aggregate state emergence shows a steady upward trend.
This pattern is also visible in Fig. 3, which in addition shows the regional aggregated
percentage score for all contemporary countries in our sample (this figure displays world and
regional averages of the State index, rather than the natural log of that average as in Fig. 2,
allowing the reader to get a sense of the trend in a form some may find more intuitive). We
disaggregate the evolution of state history into the four main agricultural core areas: Western,
29 The 5% discounted extended Statehist score (for the 3500 BCE to 2000 CE period) has a correlation of up
to 99.3% with the 5% discounted 1–1950 CE score.
30 The 1% discounted (extended) Statehist index at 2000 CE (covering the full period beginning from 3500
BCE) has a 0.93 correlation with the 1–1950 CE 1% discounted Statehist index and 0.89 correlation with the
1–1950 CE 5% discounted Statehist index. We do, however, use the 0.1 and 2% discounted index in alternative
estimations, as reported below in Sect. 5.
31 Note that State index world(t) describes the “flow” level of state development in the world in period t and
not the cumulative “stock” of state experience.
32 Since many modern-day countries did not have full states in the spirit of our definition during the entirety
of the last time period 1951–2000, the aggregate percentage in the graph is about 88% at the end of the time
series. Many states were de-colonized part way through the period, a number emerged from the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia (and thus lack home-based governments until the 1990s, following our conventions), others
experienced contending governments or state failure, etc.
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Fig. 2 Emergence of states in the world 3500 BCE–2000 CE. Note: The graph shows the logged value of
the aggregate State index for 159 countries identified during 110 50-year intervals between 3500 BCE and
2000 CE. The value 100 would signify all 159 countries in our sample are full states, as defined in our text,
including high geographical extent and unity and being entirely locally based. On the horizontal axis, negative
values imply years BCE whereas positive values show the CE period. A linear fitted regression line has been
included. The State index is calculated as described in the text
Eastern Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Americas.33 These four areas are created on the
basis of how Neolithic agriculture and civilization spread during early historical times.
When we divide up the world in this way, some striking historical differences between
the regions appear: State evolution started earliest in the Western area, with Eastern Asia
lagging behind until rough convergence (indeed, initially overtaking) around 500 CE, with
the other regions gaining steam later and all converging only toward the end of the era
of European colonialism. State emergence was earliest in Eastern Asia and in the Western
region. Interestingly, both of these early civilizations took off on a more rapid path after 850
BCE. By the time of the Western Roman collapse after 450 CE, Asian state development
overtakes the Western one for the first time.34
The other two regions, the Americas and Sub-Saharan Africa, clearly lag behind, par-
ticularly after the Eurasian turning point 850 BCE. From about 500 CE, the pace of state
emergence starts to rise in Sub-Saharan Africa. When the colonial era starts in the late 15th
century CE, the lagging regions experience a dramatic increase in the State index. This
increase is of course to a great extent driven by the emergence of colonial states, created by
33 The division into agricultural core areas follows the practice in Morris (2010) and Olsson and Paik (2013)
(see also Diamond and Bellwood 2003). Combining the two or three distinct agricultural cores of the Americas
identified by some writers is a convenient simplification.
34 See Morris (2010) for a detailed comparative analysis of Western and Eastern history since the Neolithic.
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Fig. 3 Emergence of states in four agricultural core areas and in the world as a whole 3500 BCE–2000
CE. Note: The figure shows the development of the aggregated State index in the Western agricultural zone
(including 62 current countries in Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, as well as Afghanistan, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbek-
istan), Eastern Asia (20 countries), Americas (including 27 countries in North and South America and in the
Caribbean), and Sub-Saharan Africa (47 countries). Oceania (only 3 countries in our sample) is omitted. It also
shows the aggregate index for the 159 countries in the world as a whole (solid black line). On the horizontal
axis, negative values imply years BCE whereas positive values show the CE period. Particular years with trend
breaks are marked
European powers (although z2 is capped at 0.5 so long as colonial status continues). By the
final period of observation (1951–2000), the Americas has the highest score on state presence
among all regions in the world.35
The Statehist index and other variables related to state experience, as well as outcomes
and control variables used in all forthcoming analyses are summarized in Table 1 below. Full
definitions of each variable are given in the online Appendix.
5 State history and economic development
We now proceed to analyze the relationship between state history and different indicators for
historical and contemporary levels of productivity. Our proxies for aggregate productivity
will be an index of technology adoption, population density, rates of urbanization, and GDP
per capita.
35 In Figure C2 of the online Appendix, we zoom in on the last 550 years of state history and show trends for
Western Offshoots including the U.S. and Canada (along with Australia and New Zealand) and for the rest of
the Americas (Latin America and the Caribbean). The latter two regions are shown to come from behind to
overtake even Europe in internally controlled state presence by the mid-1800s.
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Table 1 Summary statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
Panel A: State history indicators
Statehist 159 0.234 0.172 0.017 0.743
Statehist 1–1950 CE 159 0.386 0.261 0.012 0.978
Statehist in 1500 CE 159 0.171 0.183 0.000 0.760
Ancestry-Adjusted Statehist of 1500 CE 152 0.221 0.166 0.000 0.747
State age (millennia) 159 1.640 1.430 0.100 5.500
Internally-originated 159 0.491 0.501 0.000 1.000
Panel B: Outcome variables
Technology adoption in 1500 CE 112 0.487 0.317 0.000 1.000
(Log) Population density in 1500 CE 154 0.905 1.461 − 3.817 3.842
Urbanization rate in 1500 CE 83 7.278 5.134 0.000 28.000
Technology adoption in 2000 CE 130 0.451 0.198 0.174 1.012
(Log) GDP pc in 2000 CE 154 7.488 1.606 4.463 10.531
Panel C: Covariates
Agyears: 2000 CE—neolithic transition 151 4.717 2.442 0.362 10.500
Origtime: 2000 CE—first human settlement 158 58.917 49.958 0.200 160.000
Absolute centroid latitude 159 26.369 17.704 0.422 67.470
Distance to coast and rivers 149 347.334 457.408 7.952 2385.580
Landlocked 134 0.224 0.418 0.000 1.000
Mean elevation 149 637.715 551.281 9.167 3185.920
Land suitability 145 0.378 0.248 0.000 0.960
Percentage arable land 156 15.852 14.001 0.040 62.100
Temperature 158 18.226 8.350 − 7.929 28.639
Precipitation 158 92.959 61.700 2.911 259.952
Malaria (percentage population at risk) 151 0.316 0.426 0.000 1.000
The table summarizes all variables used in the analysis, as follows: (1) Panel A describes the State history
variables created by us. Note that Ancestry-Adjusted Statehist of 1500 is the average accumulated state history
to 1500 CE of the year 1500 ancestors (by territory of residence at that time) of the year 2000 population of each
country; (2) Panel B outlines some historical and economic variables which are used as dependent variables in
the regression analysis. The data for historical population density is based on population data from McEvedy
and Jones (1978) and land data from World Bank World Development Indicators. The data for urbanization rate
in 1 CE is taken from Comin et al. (2010) and is based on Peregrine (2003). The data for urbanization rate in
1500 CE is that reported by Acemoglu et al. (2005). The Average Technology Adoption indices in 1 CE, 1500
CE and 2000 CE are constructed by Comin et al. (2010). Per capita GDP is expressed in current US dollars,
as provided by the World Bank; (3) Panel C details the covariates included in the regressions. Agyears was
assembled by Putterman and Trainor (2006) and it records the number of millennia elapsed in 2000 CE since
the Neolithic transition took place. Origtime was coded by Ahlerup and Olsson (2012) and it represents the
time in millennia since initial uninterrupted settlement by modern humans (before 2000 CE). The geographic
and climatic controls are retrieved from various sources. The variables’ construction is detailed in the online
Appendix A
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5.1 State history and pre-industrial economic development
State history and productivity in 1500 CE
We begin with the empirical question of the relationship between state history and pro-
ductivity in the Malthusian era. The key predicted pattern in Fig. 1a was a hump-shaped
relationship between our state history measure and aggregate productivity in a cross-section
of countries, reflecting on the one hand that newer or more inexperienced states tend to be in
the process of converging to their own maximum productivity potential, whereas more expe-
rienced states already have attained a relatively low maximum level. Was such a tendency in
place already in 1500 CE?
As a starting point, we proxy historical productivity with the average index of technology
adoption constructed by Comin et al. (2010). Using various data sources on the presence and
complexity of various technologies, the country-level index captures advances in five sectors:
agriculture, transportation, communications, writing, and military. The index is computed for
1500 CE and 2000 CE, using slightly different approaches, which we describe in some detail
in online Appendix A.
In order to test this prediction, we set up the following model:
Technology1500i = β0 + β1 · Statehist1500i + β2 · Statehist15002i + i (4)
On the left hand-side of Eq. (4) we have the average technology adoption index in 1500 CE.
On the right-hand side we include our main independent variable, Statehist (the cumulative
index shown in Eq. (3) accumulated in 1500 CE), both linear and squared, to allow for a
quadratic relationship. The Statehist index is normalized with respect to 3500 BCE–1500
CE and computed using a 1% discount rate per period. This equation captures the potentially
hump-shaped relationship to Statehist across countries. We also consider variants of (4) that
include additional controls, represented by:
Technology1500i = β0+β1 ·Statehist1500i +β2 ·Statehist15002i +β ′j ·Zi +β ′k ·Xi +λc+i
(5)
Zi is a vector of historical controls including: Agyearsi , the time before present since
the transition to agriculture in the country in question, a variable taken from Putterman and
Trainor (2006); Origtimei —the approximate time since the first settlement on the territory of
the modern-day country by anatomically modern humans, a variable introduced by Ahlerup
and Olsson (2012) as a determinant of the variation in levels of ethnic diversity across the
world. In a more flexible specification, we include the square of Origtimei in order to account
for recent developments in the literature postulating that the patterns of human settlement
in prehistory may have nonlinear effects on later economic development (Ashraf and Galor
2013). In the same specification we also include State agei in 1500 CE (the time elapsed in
1500 CE from the date of state emergence). Xi is a vector containing geographic controls.
These include: the absolute latitude of the centroid of the modern-day country i , whether the
country is landlocked, its distance to coast or ocean-navigable river, average elevation, land
suitability for agriculture, climatic variables for temperature and precipitation, and the risk
of malaria.36 λc is a vector of continent fixed effects. The results are displayed in Table 2.
Columns (1) and (2) present linear and quadratic versions of Eq. (4), while columns (3)–(7)
add further controls, as in Eq. (5).
36 These variables are taken from the Portland Physical Geography dataset and from the dataset compiled from
various other sources by Ashraf and Galor (2013). See the online Appendix A for more details on variables’
construction and collection.
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Table 2 State history and average technology adoption in 1500 CE
Technology adoption in 1500 CE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Statehist in
1500 CE
1.152*** 2.643*** 1.809*** 1.535*** 0.811*** 1.168***
(0.118) (0.328) (0.399) (0.306) (0.198) (0.275)
Statehist in
1500 CE
squared
−2.993*** −2.585*** −1.501*** −0.340 −0.226
(0.645) (0.744) (0.543) (0.330) (0.306)
Agyears in
1500 CE
0.104*** 0.068*** 0.038*** 0.005 0.013
(0.008) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Origtime in
1500 CE
0.001 −0.001** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Origtime in
1500 CE
squared
−0.000
(0.000)
State age in
1500 CE
−0.075*
(0.043)
Observations 112 112 110 110 107 107 107
R-squared 0.446 0.558 0.532 0.641 0.818 0.904 0.912
Controls No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Continent FE No No No No No Yes Yes
The table displays OLS estimates from regressions of average technology adoption in 1500 CE on the extended
Statehist of 1500 CE, linear and squared. The Average Technology Adoption index in 1500 CE is constructed
by Comin et al. (2010). The list of controls includes: absolute latitude, an indicator of whether the present-day
country is landlocked, distance to coast and rivers, mean elevation, land suitability, percentage arable land,
temperature, precipitation, percentage population at risk of contracting malaria. Robust standard errors in
parentheses
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
In column (1) we display the simple association between technology adoption and State-
hist, which is positive and significant. In column (2), where we add Statehist squared, our main
coefficients of interest, β1 and β2, display a concave pattern: β1 is positive, while β2 is neg-
ative, both significant at 1%. In the online Appendix Table D1, we estimate this specification
using Statehist discounted by alternative factors, 0.1% and 2%, which reveal the qualitatively
identical result of significant concavity. As concavity does not imply non-monotonicity, to
test for the latter, we run piece-wise estimations using the linear Statehist separately in coun-
tries below and above the technology-maximizing level of Statehist implied from Eq. (4)
(which is 0.44, with only 9 countries recording a higher Statehist of 1500 CE).37 The results
reported for different Statehist discount rates in the online Appendix Table D2, including
our main case 1% rate, show positive insignificant slopes above the maximizing Statehist.
Therefore, we do not find an inverse-u shape in the case of technology adoption in 1500 CE.
In column (4) we add to the model the first historical control - Agyears (shown to be
positively significantly correlated with the dependent variable in column 3, for comparison
purposes). Its inclusion only slightly changes the signs and the magnitude of the coefficients
of the Statehist terms. Moreover, the effect of the time from transition to agriculture is reduced
relative to column (3). When we also add Origtime and geographical controls in column
(5), the magnitude of the estimates changes slightly, but the relationship remains concave.
37 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this method of testing whether our estimated hump-
shaped relationships have rising and falling portions. This method with wide applications in social sciences,
is proposed and discussed in Simonsohn (2016).
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The continent fixed effects in the last two columns reduce the squared term’s coefficient,
which becomes insignificant.38
State history, population and urbanization in 1500 CE
We now inquire whether this concave pattern is reflected in other commonly used indicators
of historical productivity: population density (Table 3, panel A) and urbanization rate in 1500
CE (Table 3, panel B). All specifications are analogous to those in Table 2.
The extended Statehist is positively and significantly correlated with past population den-
sity and urbanization (column 1). Column 2 shows, however, that a quadratic relationship fits
the data even better, with both linear and square terms obtaining highly significant estimated
coefficients (the same holds when using discounts of 0.1% of 2%, as Appendix Table D3
shows). The population density maximizing level of Statehist is that of Greece (around 0.42).
For population density, the below/above maximum regressions including only linear State-
hist (Appendix Table D4) display negative slopes above the maximizing value of Statehist ,
significant when we use a 2% discount rate for Statehist. Hence, some evidence indicates an
inverse-u shape already forming in 1500 CE (albeit not when we look at urbanization, which
is maximized by a Statehist value of 0.64, which is above the range represented in the data).
Both for population density and urbanization, quadratic yet monotonic patterns emerge in
the specifications which introduce controls and continent fixed effects. In conclusion, while
there are clear signs of diminishing benefits of additional state experience as of 1500 CE,
there are few indications that added state experience was a net liability for more experienced
states as of that year.39
5.2 State history and current economic development
In our theoretical framework, the downward sloping portion of the cross-country Fig. 1a was
assumed to result from less experienced states overtaking more experienced ones. The other
portion may be explained by the many states in several parts of the world which emerged
only in recent centuries. Thus, we expect contemporary levels of development to correlate
in a non-monotonic fashion with accumulated Statehist. To investigate this, we estimate the
model with technology adoption and GDP per capita in 2000 CE as a quadratic function of
state history. The results are displayed in Tables 4, 5 and 6 below.
However, when analyzing the current levels of technological sophistication or output,
using the raw Statehist data means that we only account for the history within the territories
of present-day countries. This ignores the state history of other territories from which people
migrated in recent centuries to settle in new territories. Population flows after 1500, when
the era of colonization began, are instrumental in mapping the impact of historical events
to today’s economic performance. This is because the ancestors of today’s population have
evidently brought with them the history, the know-how and the experience with state insti-
38 We also fitted similar regression models where technology adoption and Statehist correspond to year 1
CE. The results in Table D14 display some evidence of a concave, albeit less robust relationship between
Statehist and technology adoption, as the coefficients are reduced in magnitude and become insignificant
when controlling for the time since the transition to agriculture. As a robustness check, we have also redone
the estimations for 1500 CE and 1 CE using the overall technology adoption index excluding the agriculture
components; the results for 1500 CE are very similar to those in Table 2, and they display a significant quadratic
relationship in the most complete specifications for 1 CE (see Table D15 in the Appendix).
39 We also fitted similar regression models where these economic outcomes correspond to year 1 CE, and
depend on Statehist up to that year, linear and squared. The results displayed in Table D16 display some
evidence of a concave relationship between Statehist and historical economic outcomes, but one that is less
robust in 1 CE than in 1500 CE, because the coefficients are reduced in magnitude and become insignificant
when controlling for the time since the transition to agriculture.
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tutions from their places of origin (Putterman and Weil 2010; Comin et al. 2010; Ashraf and
Galor 2013).
We therefore also use an alternative measure of state history which is obtained by adjust-
ing the 1500 CE Statehist index with the migration matrix developed by Putterman and
Weil (2010). We then re-estimate our model using this new measure—the ancestry-adjusted
Statehist—which, for each country, represents the average pre-industrial Statehist of its year
2000 population’s ancestors, with the weights for each source country being the share of
then-living ancestors estimated to have lived on its present-day territory. These alternative
results are displayed in Tables 4, panel B and 6.
Technology adoption in 2000 CE displays a similar concave relationship with year 2000
Statehist as did the technology index of year 1500 CE (Table 4, panel A). Furthermore, using
the ancestry-adjusted Statehist in 1500 CE to explain the differences in average technology
adoption in 2000 yields robustly significant estimates across all specifications, with larger
magnitudes and higher R-squared statistics than when using the Statehist in 2000 CE. This
result is consistent with our theoretical expectation that the relationship between technology
and state experience was concave in the late Malthusian era, and that it was transmitted all the
way into modern-day levels of technology adoption. The unconditional relationship shown in
column (2) of Table 4, panel B, withstands using different discount rates for Statehist, and the
relationship exhibits the downward sloping portion of an inverted-u shape in regressions with
a linear Statehist above and below its implied maximizing value (panel B in Tables D5–D8).40
Given the central role of aggregate productivity in the standard production functions for
total output, we argue the hump-shape should also emerge when we look at GDP. Figure 4
illustrates the essence of our findings. On the Y-axis we have the logarithm of GDP per capita
in 2000 and on the X-axis we have the extended Statehist (normalized with respect to 3500
BCE–2000 CE and computed using a 1% discount rate per period).
The figure displays a scatter plot of all countries in the sample, while also allowing for a
quadratic fit of the relationship between output and Statehist. The hump-shaped relationship
emerges when using the extended Statehist.41 In the online Appendix Figure C3, we show
that the state history index based on 1–1950 CE data does not display the downward sloping
portion seen in Fig. 4.
We estimate the quadratic relationship to the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2000 CE
in Table 5, panel A. In panel B, the Statehist 1–1950 CE data are used for purposes of
comparison. All specifications are analogous to the ones in the previous tables.
As before, the simple correlation between per capita income and Statehist (column 1) is
positive and similar in magnitude across the two panels, but slightly less precisely estimated
when the independent variable is the extended Statehist. In column (2) we add the squared
Statehist, and the results mirror the pattern in Fig. 4: In panel A, both coefficients are sig-
nificant at 1%, and their signs confirm the concave relationship between log per capita GDP
and state history. By contrast, in panel B, the counterpart of this specification using Statehist
40 In the mentioned appendix tables, that is, we check that the concavity of the quadratic form in Table 4
has significant upward and downward sloping portions by splitting the sample at the implied maximum of the
dependent variable with respect to Statehist, and estimating regressions using only the linear Statehist term
for the samples to the left and right of that maximum. Significant estimated coefficients on that term are taken
as confirmation that the concavity of the quadratic form entails both upward and downward sloping portions.
41 This quadratic relationship is also suggested by the scatter plots displayed separately for internally- and
externally- originated states (i.e. the rule in the first ever state or paramount chiefdom on a certain territory
was imposed from within that territory and from without, respectively) and when we use the ancestry-adjusted
Statehist index. See Figures C4–C6 in the Appendix.
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Fig. 4 Non-linear relationship between Log GDP per capita in 2000 and Statehist index. Note: The figure
shows a fitted quadratic regression line corresponding to the estimates in Table 5, panel A, column 2, with
154 country observations distinguished by 3-letter country isocodes. On the Y-axis we have the logarithm of
GDP per capita in 2000 and on the X-axis we have the extended Statehist (see Eq. (3) above). An increase in
Statehist by 0.1 is interpreted approximately as an additional 300 years of effective fully autonomous statehood
1–1950 CE displays coefficients with the same signs but much smaller and insignificant (the
coefficient of the quadratic term becomes positive when controls are included).42
While Agyears is significantly positively correlated with modern-day GDP (column 3),
when we control for it alongside the linear and quadratic Statehist, its inclusion hardly changes
the signs and the magnitudes of the coefficients of the Statehist terms. Moreover, the effect
of the time from transition to agriculture is insignificant when the Statehist terms are added
(column 4), indicating that although early states may only have arisen where agriculture had
long been practiced, a country’s subsequent experience with states eclipses its experience of
agriculture as a predictor of current productivity. As with technology, the concavity is robust
to using alternative discount rates (0.1 and 2%) to calculate Statehist (Appendix Tables D5–
D6). Moreover, separate linear estimates below and above the maximizing Statehist display
a large, significant downward slope for countries in the upper range, consistent with Fig. 4
(Table D6, in the online Appendix).43,44 This confirms that a very limited or very extensive
experience with state institutions can become a relative disadvantage across nations.
42 Note that we obtain similar estimates if we use the 1–2000 CE Statehist index instead, meaning that the
1951–2000 CE period is not what is driving the quadratic relationship documented in panel A.
43 With a lower discount factor of 0.1%, we still find a negative, (albeit insignificant for log GDP per capita)
linear relationship on the portion above the maximizing level of Statehist implied from the quadratic speci-
fications not including any controls. We find a significant negative linear relationship for the high Statehist
countries with discount factor 2%, so a qualitatively similar outcome appears over the broad range of discount
factors, at least spanning 0.1–2%. Hence the results are not ultra-sensitive over a range of potential weights
the BCE part could receive.
44 Results of this test are very similar if we control for the time since the Neolithic transition.
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The concavity results are robust to the inclusion of Origtime, as well as geographical
controls and continent fixed effects.45 However, the coefficients on Statehist squared are
smaller than the linear terms’ coefficients as more controls are introduced in columns (5)-
(7). This implies that the optimum level of Statehist falls very close to, or outside the top
of its range. Does this mean that the hump-shaped relationship between state history and
income suggested by the earlier estimates (e.g., columns 2 and 4) is mistaken? We think not.
Our framework posits such a relationship between state history and productivity as emerging
across countries, whereas each individual country’s trajectory is described by a logistic curve,
with no downward sloping portion (see the left side of Fig. 1a). As the number of factors
controlled by our regressions grows, we may be approaching a situation in which the estimated
coefficients on the focal Statehist variables will reflect only differences between otherwise
nearly identical countries within a very narrow sub-region (countries not only in the same
continent but sharing almost identical geographic coordinates, climate, etc.), as well as a very
similar date of state origins, as indicated by the inclusion in column (7) of the variable state
age. The resulting estimates of concavity without evidence of a downward sloped portion is
consistent with the logistic curve pattern expected for any single country (left side of Fig. 1a)
rather than the hump shape predicted for the full cross-section of countries over which state
histories show wider variation.
Is our finding of concavity of per capita GDP with respect to state history in fact attributable
to having included coding of state presence in the BCE era in our analysis, unlike previous
studies? To see that this is the case, compare panel B of Table 5, which shows estimates of
similar specifications but using the old state history variable covering years 1–1950 CE only.
The main estimates are neither significant nor similar in terms of signs with the estimates in
panel A.
Lastly, from column (2) in Table 5, based on the estimates of our coefficients of interest,
we can infer that the predicted income-maximizing level of Statehist is reached at 0.355,
which is very close to that of the United Kingdom and most countries in Western Europe.
The effects’ magnitudes are not straightforward to assess from the tables. However, some
numerical examples may show more clearly how the impact upon per capita GDP of an
increase in Statehist depends on the level of state experience at which the change occurs.
Take for instance the case of Indonesia, which has 1350 years of state existence and a Statehist
score of 0.254. If we could hypothetically increase the Statehist score by 0.1 (which is 58%
of Statehist’s standard deviation, but enough to add 335 full-state years making it reach the
level of the UK score), the implied approximate effect on per capita GDP in 2000 would be
roughly a 20% increase, from USD 773 to USD 944 in 2000.46 The opposite would happen
if we were to increase the value of the Statehist score by 0.1 for China, which starts off with
a value of 0.582 (a value exceeded by only five countries in the sample): the approximate
effect would be a drop in per capita GDP in 2000 by 44.4%.
Taken together, our estimation results so far are consistent with our predicted pattern.
Moreover, this becomes evident only when we employ the new extended Statehist index.
Are the estimates improved by accounting for the state histories of the ancestors of present-
day populations, instead of the state histories of places? To investigate this, we estimate the
model for per capita GDP above using the ancestry-adjusted Statehist index. The results are
45 We also explore alternative specifications in Tables D9 and D10 in the Appendix, where we include linear
and squared variables such as the time since transition to agriculture, state age, absolute latitude, migratory
distance from Addis Ababa, and predicted genetic diversity (where the latter two are taken from Ashraf and
Galor 2013). Our main coefficients of interest are robust.
46 The exact calculation based on estimates in column 2 of panel A is [(7.010−2 ·9.842 ·0.254)/10] ·100% =
20.1%.
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displayed in Table 6, where we use the Statehist index in 1500 CE adjusted by the migration
matrix (as in previous studies, but for the first time including full state history before 1 CE).47
We find that the concave relationship between per capita income and the ancestry-adjusted
Statehist is robust to all specifications and that the coefficients of interest are significant
at 1% level in all columns in panel A. Moving from a linear (column 1) to a quadratic
function (column 2) in Statehist as in all other tables, greatly improves the goodness of fit,
strengthening the case for a nonlinear specification. Moreover, the explanatory power of
the model (as measured by the regression R-squared) when we introduce only the ancestry-
adjusted Statehist terms (column 2) is now 23.4% versus 5.2% for unadjusted Statehist.48
In the online Appendix Table D12 we look at how sensitive the results from specifications
where we include controls and county fixed effects are to excluding various countries from the
sample. The estimates describing a concave function are significant when we exclude in turn
the Middle-East and Sub-Saharan Africa, but the standard errors increase and the Statehist
squared is insignificant when we exclude both these and North Africa (column 4). This is
because this exclusion takes away a large part of the variation in Statehist that is due to very
short and very long state age. Nevertheless, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients point
to the same concave relationship. There is no evidence of a concave relationship in the sample
of European colonies, which are all very young and with little experience with home-based
rule relative to the rest of the sample (median age 550 years and average 1180 years).49
5.3 Statehist mechanisms
So far we have looked at the accumulated Statehist, which summarizes via their interaction
(i) the variation in state age (the time elapsed since the first occurrence of z1 > 0),50 (ii) the
degree to which the state was home-based (z2), and (iii) the state’s territorial completeness
and unity (z3). In this sub-section, we briefly investigate the distinct effects of those three
components and their respective contributions to the inverse-u shape. In Appendix Table D13,
we estimate variants of columns (1), (2), (5) and (7) from Table 2, replacing Statehist with
each of its components, in turn. Without controls (column 2), a quadratic relationship is found
for each component (panels A–C), although for z3 (territorial completeness), the coefficients
in quadratic specification (2) are not statistically significant, whereas when included alone,
the level term attains a positive coefficient (in column 1) that is significant at the 5% level.
47 Note that we use state history only up to 1500, rather than to 2000. This is because there are no systematic
data on the timing of the migrations during the half millennium 1500–2000. We have estimated the same model
using an alternative measure of state experience combining the ancestry-adjusted Statehist of 1500 CE with
the unadjusted Statehist score for the period 1500–2000. The results are similar to the estimates in Table 5.
48 The explanatory power in column 7 across all the tables is around 1% point larger than when we only
include the linear Statehist (results available upon request). As with the unadjusted Statehist, we also explore
alternative specifications in the online Appendix Table D10, including various controls in linear and squared
form and the results are consistent across all columns.
49 We also run some sensitivity checks to see if the estimated concavity conditional on controls is merely
reflecting some unobserved heterogeneity between countries or regions, such as the Middle-East, North Africa
and Sub-Saharan Africa. In the online Appendix Table D11 we present the baseline specifications from
Tables 5 and 6, panel A, column (7) followed by similar specifications amended to include controls for the
aforementioned regions (column 2), a dummy for former European colonies (column 3) and legal origin
controls (column 4). The estimates are very similar to those in the baseline specifications.
50 For convenience of interpretation, the exercise in this section uses state age (years since first state appear-
ance) rather than discounted z1. While the latter can revert to 0 or 0.75 after periods with value 1 due to
state collapse or existence of a macro-political vacuum following contraction of an outside empire, such cases
are extremely rare in practice, hence the difference between discounted z1 and state age is almost entirely
attributable to not applying discounting to the latter.
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When all three separate component terms are included simultaneously, in panel D, the results
are similar. Two of the three components (state age, and territorial completeness/unity) also
obtain highly significant positive coefficients in a strictly linear specification (column 1).
Taken together, these results support that each component, not only state age, has some
importance in its own right, a finding not explored in previous studies. When additional
controls are added in column (3), and continent fixed effects as well in column (4), only the
coefficient on level of z2 (home rule) remains statistically significant. Its positive sign suggests
that having been independent rather than part of an externally based empire is most robustly
and significantly associated with favorable outcomes, among the three components.51
5.4 Borders endogeneity and spatial dependence
We now turn to the issue of whether endogeneity of borders raises concerns about the relia-
bility of our findings. Throughout history, borders shifted as states consolidated or weakened
their administrative or military capacities, or incurred political regime changes. For instance,
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) showed that democratization can lead to secession, an exam-
ple of which is the case of the Balkan countries. Gennaioli and Voth (2015) showed that
the post-1500 military innovations in Europe led to more efficient warfare, stronger state
capacity to finance warfare, and imminent territorial conquests or redistribution, which have
redefined country borders. Their examples of Silesia, Alsace-Lorraine, and the Duchy of
Milan are joined by numerous others, such as the regions split in the Peace of Westphalia
in 1648 amongst Sweden, France, The Dutch Republic, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire.
European colonisation is a leading example where late comers, having overtaken older states,
proceeded to redraw the borders of these states in Latin America, North Africa, the Middle
East and the Indian subcontinent. Against this backdrop, defining the state experience and
economic indicators on the basis of present-day country borders may induce several risks.
First, there is a risk of retroactive measurement error, due to the fact that the current coun-
tries’ territories used to compute historical values of Statehist often bear little resemblance
with the geopolitical logic in ancient times (with a few exceptions like Norway, Sweden, and
Japan). We should note that our definition of Statehist requires keeping track of the changing
boundaries of states-of-the-time within and across half-centuries, and the scores account for
multiple polities, the internal or external basis of their rule and the percentage of territory they
occupied within what may be thought of as an arbitrarily defined territory, from the stand-
point of early periods. Although the state presence in some polities or sub-territories may be
measured with error, if this error is random, at worst our estimates are biased towards zero. It
would be more difficult to predict the bias if measurement error was correlated with the out-
come variables, e.g. if borders shifted through conquest or colonization to include territories
with more/less state history, productivity and technological sophistication, potentially also
associated with the accuracy of data sources. Even so, the amalgamation of low information
areas together into countries with better information and more state history is likely to lead to
51 Note that even though a discount rate of 1% only is applied, more weight is nonetheless placed on the
past two and especially the last millennium than on earlier times. Hence, the long periods following earliest
antiquity during which such ancient cradles of civilization as today’s Egypt and Iraq were colonies of the
Roman, Byzantine, Mongol, Ottoman, and other empires, can cause their relatively low incomes today to
be attributed in part to this term. The ancient experiences of parts of today’s UK, Germany, or Belgium as
one-time Roman colonies, on the other hand, receives less weight given the many centuries of home-based
rule that were present thereafter. Countries with no state in our sense prior to the European colonial epoch,
coded as colonies during that time—for example Dominican Republic, Brazil, Zambia, Mozambique—have
z2 of 0 or 0.5 in those eras, their middle or low incomes today also accordingly helping to explain the strength
of the coefficient on z2.
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a reduction of error for the low Statehist parts of those countries, since the histories of such
areas are typically better documented than are those of otherwise similar areas more distant
from record-keeping societies. A second concern is that, as discussed earlier, productivity
and technological sophistication sometimes drive conquest, moving borders and influencing
state history. While we cannot fully dismiss the problem of endogenous borders, the issue of
selection into state history is partly mitigated in cross-country regressions with contempora-
neous economic development by the fact that whatever state-level polities existed at this and
that period within the boundaries of what are today countries have changed their borders on
many occasions and for a wide variety of reasons.
An alternative to using country borders could have been to divide the world randomly
into equal-sized grid cells and then study the history of states and economic development in
each such cell (e.g. Michalopoulos 2012). State history has been coded at the grid-cell level
for sub-Saharan Africa after 1000 CE by Depetris-Chauvin (2014). For the present study,
however, this would require constructing disaggregated data on a global scale for nearly
six thousand years. The challenge with this approach, in addition to the sheer magnitude of
the exercise, would be the precarious state history information for many grid cells. Average
quality of data may well be higher with the countries-of-today approach than would be
achievable with grid cells, unless a research effort several orders-of-magnitude larger were
undertaken. With these caveats in mind, to the extent that researchers are interested in tracking
the histories of countries in order to understand contemporary levels of development, the
modern configuration of countries is still a natural point of departure.
A third concern, which is particularly salient in the context of jointly determined borders,
is that the histories and outcomes of neighbouring countries transcend national boundaries.
Countries in the same geographical or geopolitical regions tend to have correlated productivity
levels and experience similar productivity shocks, for instance through contemporary diffu-
sion of new technologies. In the presence of such spatial spillovers, the standard assumptions
on the independence of observations are violated, and OLS regressions might yield biased and
inefficient estimates. In this case, modelling spatial dependence is a more suitable approach.
To account for potential spatial autocorrelation in the disturbances, we estimated alternative
regressions using the Conley (1999) correction of the standard errors.52 The results, displayed
in Appendix Table D17 (panel A for Statehist and panel B for Ancestry-Adjusted Statehist)
are very similar to the counterparts in Tables 5 (panel A) and 6, despite the fact that standard
errors are, if anything, slightly larger than in the OLS regressions. We also estimate models
where we allow the dependent variable to be a function of neighbouring countries’ outcomes
(the spatial autoregressive model—SAR) and where we allow both the dependent variable
and the errors terms to follow spatial autoregressive processes (SARAR).53 In both models
we input a matrix of weights given by the inverse great-circle distances between geodesic
centroids.54 Appendix Tables D18 and D19 show that the results with the Ancestry-Adjusted
Statehist are robust across models, and that the SARAR results for Statehist generate qualita-
52 The idea is that covariance matrices are weighted by the inverse of the distance between countries, with the
weights becoming null after a specified threshold. In this case, we have set a threshold of twenty coordinate
degrees, but the results are robust to various thresholds.
53 Spatial autocorrelation models are increasingly used in long-run growth studies. See e.g. Ashraf and
Michalopoulos (2015) and Ashraf and Galor (2013). The typical approach, which we also adopt, is the
maximum likelihood estimator from Drukker et al. (2013), implemented in Stata through the spreg command.
54 SARAR models are y = λWy + Xβ + u, with u = ρMu + , where W and M are n × n spatial weighting
matrices, n is the sample size, λ and ρ are scalars, and Wy and Mu are n × 1 vectors representing spatial lags.
We estimate a model where W=M is a matrix with diagonal elements equal to zero, and off-diagonal elements
representing the inverse great-circle distances between geodesic centroids. In a SAR model, the difference is
that u is assumed to be independently and identically distributed.
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tively similar but insignificant results. We also report the SARAR estimates using a contiguity
matrix defined not by geographical proximity, but by whether countries share the same legal
origins (Appendix Table D20).55 All results hold, with the linear and squared terms of both
extended and Ancestry-Adjusted indices remaining significant. In sum, accounting for spatial
spillovers does little to affect the results with extended state history and leaves the results
with Ancestry-Adjusted indices unchanged.56
6 Discussion and conclusions
To sum up, we have presented a model of the role of state history in economic development
wherein growing state experience is associated with increases in productivity in the individ-
ual country, but where countries with less history of state presence may have a productivity
advantage compared to ones with more experience of state institutions. We have coded and
assembled a comprehensive data series on state history from state emergence (which often
occurred before the Common Era) to 2000 CE for a sample of 159 countries, building on
the previously constructed State antiquity index of Bockstette et al. (2002). The resulting
empirical analysis revealed consistent reduced-form regressions, where a hump-shaped rela-
tionship is confirmed between extended Statehist and technology and economic development
in 2000 CE. This relationship is robust to using a fairly wide range of discounts of the past, to
controlling for duration of reliance on agriculture, and to assuming that migrants beginning
with the age of European colonization carried the state experience of their home countries
with them in the form of a portable and transmissible cultural heritage. Although the esti-
mated coefficients cease to indicate an absolute decline in income at the highest levels of
state experience after the addition of enough controls, this finding is consistent with the
relationship being concave and monotonic within the individual country, the hump-shaped
pattern being predicted only for cross-country and evidently cross-regional comparison at a
particular historical juncture.
Although an extensive analysis of the causal mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper,
we believe we have offered support from the literature that improvements in the quality of
institutions that are more easily achieved by states of intermediate age provide a plausible
explanation for this pattern. Our finding appears to be consistent with the fact that while
there is indeed a great deal of persistence of early societal advantages, it is also the case that
the technological and institutional know-how of societies can slowly diffuse to neighbouring
societies through migration or trade. These societies with younger states and/or a higher
degree of autonomy can then pick the best practices of the older societies and potentially
avoid some of the pitfalls that might have become a drag for the old civilizations.
State capacity might be one example of such institutional transfer across state borders.
The ability to levy taxes and to consolidate an administrative infrastructure has recently
been shown to produce regional spill-overs to neighbouring areas’ economic performance
55 The diagonal elements of this spatial weighting matrix are zero, and the off-diagonal elements are 1 if
countries i and j have the same legal origins, regardless of whether they are British, French, Socialist, German
or Scandinavian
56 The latter supports not only the robustness of our general finding about the inverse-u shape, but also
Putterman and Weil’s point that effects of early state experience on current day economic outcomes are
better manifested when we take into account that the contemporary populations of many countries, e.g. in
the Americas and Oceania, are mostly descendants of people from other countries who carry those countries’
cultural and institutional experiences with them. This is also consistent with Lagerlöf (2016) results showing
concavity with the CE part of Statehist when accounting for migration.
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(Acemoglu et al. 2015). Such spill-overs might occur more easily, however, among countries
sharing similar histories, including depth of experience with centralized authority.
There are also other factors that have been proposed for explaining the reversal in the
Western core, including environmental degradation in the Fertile Crescent and in parts of the
Mediterranean region. Once agriculture spread out of the Fertile Crescent, the more robust
loess soils of northern Europe, combined with a reliance on rain rather than irrigation for
cultivation, proved to be an advantage in the long run (Jones 1981). It has also been suggested
that the rise and fall of dominant empires of the Western core followed cycles of expansion,
over-extension, and eventually decline, with a gradual shift of power towards the northwest
(Kennedy 1989). Acemoglu et al. (2005) show that the emergence of Atlantic trade after
1500 CE had a major impact on the rise of for instance Spain and the United Kingdom.57
A similar process can potentially explain comparative development in East Asia. Japan’s
less powerful central court and greater perceived vulnerability to potential Western colonizers
led it to undertake decisive modernization measures almost a century before China. This
development had spillover effects on Korea and Taiwan, all young states in comparison with
China.
In summary, the new pattern uncovered by the extended Statehist shows that although
greater depth of state experience is associated with better economic outcomes when the mea-
sure used emphasizes mainly the millennium before 1500, the relationship of state history to
income and technology includes a range of excessive age or senescence, if we account for the
BCE millennia and give them sufficient weight. We leave it for future work to attempt to iden-
tify the exact mechanisms behind this pattern. However, we believe caution is recommended
against the interpretation of these disadvantages as fully automatic and insurmountable con-
sequences of long state histories. Our view is not that a long uninterrupted state history is
always bad for economic development and as such undesirable. We believe this is a story of
moderation in the exercise of centralized power and adaptability of the state institutions to the
ever-changing economic realities. While those in the middle range of state history have thus
far exhibited such moderation and adaptability more effectively, on average, there remains a
considerable space of indeterminacy within which political actors may still exert influence
over their countries’ fates.
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provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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